Proxmark3 enables $10k Apple Pay exploit

This exploit isn't just a bug; it's a structural failure where the desire for seamless transit UX has trumped fundamental security handshake protocols.

• –The attack relies on "bit-flipping" the Card Transaction Qualifiers (CTQ) header to misidentify a retail terminal as a low-value transit gate.
• –While Mastercard utilizes asymmetric RSA cryptography to verify headers, Visa's protocol lacks this safeguard in certain offline-capable environments.
• –Proxmark3 serves as the essential hardware bridge, acting as a programmable NFC relay between the target phone and a rogue terminal emulator.
• –Apple and Visa have both deflected responsibility, citing "industrial legacy" and "zero liability" rather than overhauling the global transit infrastructure.
• –Developers should view this as a cautionary tale on the risks of allowing "trusted" shortcuts that bypass multi-factor authentication.