Unsafe bash approval exposes Copilot CLI risk
A Reddit user says a terminal-based coding agent repeatedly mangled chained bash commands, created a mess of bad directories, and then proposed a “fix” that included `rm -rf`, which slipped past approval. The incident happened inside an isolated Proxmox VM, so the damage was contained to the project, but it still served as a sharp reminder that shell-enabled agents need hard sandboxing, careful review, and narrow command scopes.
Hot take: this is less about “bad AI” and more about how quickly a terminal agent becomes dangerous when the approval UX is too trusting.
- –One mistaken approval in a shell session can do real damage faster than most code-review workflows can catch it.
- –The failure mode is compounded by retries, bad escaping, and agents trying to self-correct with destructive commands.
- –The thread mirrors a broader pattern in terminal agents like Copilot CLI, Codex, and Claude Code: productivity jumps, but so does blast radius.
- –Isolation helped here, but the post makes a strong case for per-task sandboxes, least-privilege access, and stricter command confirmation.
DISCOVERED
45d ago
2026-05-03
PUBLISHED
45d ago
2026-05-03
RELEVANCE
AUTHOR
TheQuantumPhysicist