ChatGPT Routes Follow-Up Calls Across Connectors
A developer reports that ChatGPT silently routed a confirmation follow-up from Connector A through Connector B, carrying a one-time code across separate OAuth clients. The server rejected the mismatched code, but the behavior could enable cross-app data leakage when connector boundaries are not enforced.
This is a serious trust-boundary failure: connector identity must follow the conversation’s authorization context, not merely the shared MCP endpoint.
- –Two connectors can represent different apps, tenants, or environments even when they use the same MCP server
- –Silent routing undermines user consent because the confirmed widget and executing connector can differ
- –Server-side OAuth binding prevented this reproduction from succeeding, but not every connector may enforce that check
- –Developers should bind confirmation tokens and sensitive state to connector identity, OAuth client, and tenant—not just server URL
DISCOVERED
1h ago
2026-11-07
PUBLISHED
3h ago
2026-11-06
RELEVANCE
AUTHOR
Aldipower
